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Abstract Thi.-i paper estimates the fishing co.sts and the returns to fishing for
nine commercial salmon fleets in Alaska. The econometric model uses a two-
stage least squares estimation procedure to estimate the effect of congestion
and heterogeneity on the returns to fishermen. The hypotheses that fishermen
are homogenous and that there is no congestion externality present in the
fisheries are strongly rejected. The data indicates that fishermen are quite
heterogeneous in fishing skill levels. This difference accounts for the overall
estimates of positive net returns to the common property fisheries. Estimates
ofthe net returns to the fisheries suggest that the returns to different gear types
vary largely. The set net fleets are found to have the highest return as a
percentage of total revenues.
Keywords Fishing costs, econometric model, heterogeneity, skill rents, com-
mercial salmon fisheries.
Introduction
Managers of fisheries generally keep very good information on the timing, loca-
tion, and value of catch within a season. They also keep track of some data on the
level of capitalization in the fishery. They may even have some idea about the
elasticity of demand for the fishery. However, it is rare that information regarding
the costs of fishermen is collected by managers. This means that policy decisions
which change the regulatory structure or the total catch of the fishery are formu-
lated based on data that may describe the effect on revenues, but does not de-
scribe the effect on profits. This is unfortunate, since it is the latter which best
measures the economic welfare of the fishermen.
In part this problem has been due to the slowness of economists in abandoning
the concept of homogeneous effort. If effort is homogeneous, then the common
property nature of the fishery causes economic rents to the fishery to be driven to
zero. Thus fishermen's welfare is a moot point. However, if fishermen are differ-
entiated from one another by skills differences, then there are economic rents that
will be accrued to these skills. Thus even if the economic rents to the fishery are
dissipated by the common property nature ofthe fishery, there will still exist
economic rents to the fishermen as long as there exist skill differences among
them.
This is a substantially revised version of the project report prepared for the Alaska State
Legislature. Thanks to two anonymous referees for pushing me to test some of the more
interesting hypotheses reported below. All remaining errors are my own.
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One way to rectify the lack of information about the costs fishermen incur
would be to begin collecting data on fishing costs. However, this is quite costly
and. unless collected annually, would provide only a snapshot of fishing costs.
This method is also inappropriate in that it does not measure true opportunity
costs, such as income foregone in other occupations (or other fisheries).
Fortunately, a viable altemative exists which makes use of readily available
data. Commercial fishermen are faced with a series of openings for which they
have to choose whether or not to participate. The value of participating in a
particular opening will depend upon the expected returns from that opening.
Fishermen will choose to participate if they expect the returns to exceed their
costs of participating. Thus, even though costs are not directly observed, the
number of fishermen participating and the revenues can be used to construct
estimates of fishing costs.
The fundamental empirical insight driving the results of this paper is that it is
observed that while the number of fishermen participating in an opening increases
with the total expected returns available, it does so at a decreasing rate. Data from
salmon fisheries in Alaska is found to exhibit a consistent pattern where a x%
increase in available total revenues draws in less than x% additional fishermen. It
is shown below that this result is inconsistent with the standard model of homog-
enous fishermen. In addition, there is substantial evidence that the fishermen are
heterogeneous. There exists evidence of variance in the total as well as daily gross
revenues of fishermen, in number of days fishermen participate, the number of
areas they visit, the number of processors they sell to. and in the number of times
they move from one location to another.
If fishermen face different returns to fishing, then there exist infra-marginal
skill rents. With the assumption that the marginal entrant earns zero skill rents, a
model can be estimated which measures the net returns to fishermen from par-
ticipating. From this data, estimates of fishing costs and producers' surplus can be
obtained.
The model is estimated using data from nine commercial salmon fisheries in
Alaska. The results are used to compute producers' surplus estimates for each of
the nine fisheries for the 1990 season. The policy issue is what effect wiil a change
in the salmon stocks have on the returns to fishermen in the state? The State of
Alaska provides funding directly and indirectly to a commercial salmon hatchery
program. This gives the state some control over the aggregate harvest levels.
Recent decreases in prices for salmon have caused the state to re-evaluate the
program. This study is one part of a general cost benefit analysis on the entire
hatchery program (see Herrmann & Greenberg, 1993 and Boyce, et al, 1993). This
paper focuses on one aspect of that problem, namely the variable profits to fish-
ermen.
The Case Against a Homogenous Fishermen Model
Empirical Evidence
The empirical evidence from the Alaska salmon fisheries supports the hypothesis
that there exists a degree of heterogeneity in the fleets. This is evident over a







Figure 1. Distributions of 1990 seasonal gross revenues by fleet
cumulative distributions of 1990 individual fishermen's seasonal gross revenues
for seven Alaskan salmon fleets. The data shows a broad distribution in returns
per vessel within each gear type and fleet. The differences between the distribu-
tions for similar fleets in different areas is due to differences in the available
fishing opportunities across the areas. The differences in the distributions across
gear types within regions is due mainly to fieet allocation differences, which are
politically determined. Fleet allocations of the harvest are determined well in
advance of the season. They have remained relatively stable in percentage terms
over the last decade.
While the fishermen are heterogeneous within each fleet, the differences are
relatively stable over time. Figure 2 shows the relationship between 1986 and 1990
data for all fishermen who were active in both years in the Prince William Sound
drift net (N = 381) and Cook Inlet purse seine (N = 36) fisheries. Each data point
represents a particular fisherman. The relationships for average gross revenues
per day, the number of days active, and season gross revenues show a positive
correlation across years. Thus, fishermen who do better than average in one year
tend to do better than average in other years. Similar relationships can be found
for other fisheries and for other variables. For example, the number of trips, the
number of areas visited, the number of processors sold to, etc., also show a
positive correlation over time.370 J. R. Boyce
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Figure 2. Heterogeneity over seasons for selected variables and fleets
Theoretical Evidence
Taxes, though long demonstrated to be capable of solving the common property
problem if properly administered, are rarely used in fishery management. If fish-
ermen were homogenous, then in the simple homogenous fishermen model such
as that depicted in Figure 3 (a), no fisherman is earning positive economic profits.
After a Pigouvian tax is imposed, the number of fishermen declines, but no re-
maining fisherman earns positive profits since the economic rents are taxed away.
However, if the fishermen expect any proportion of the tax to be refunded to
them, even just a tiny percentage, then they are all made better off with a tax than
without. This simple logic has yet to convince fishermen to stand behind a tax
system as a means of capturing the rents to the fishery.
Now, consider the effect of a Pigouvian tax when fishermen are heterogeneous
with respect to their costs. Figure 3 (b) shows the effect of a Pigouvian tax in this
event. Given the open access effort level is EQ, the per unit effort tax that will
maximize total rents to society is t. With a tax of t per unit effort, effort will
contract to E,, the optimal level. However, consider the rents under open access
and under the tax. Under open access the E, most efficient fishermen earn infra-
marginal rents equal to rectangle A and triangle B. With a tax of t, the infra-
marginal rents to this group are only B. Thus for these fishermen to prefer a tax
to open access, their tax rebate has to be larger than the area A. The next most





Figure 3. Effect of a tax on fishery rents and infra-marginal rents
or equal to the Eoth fisherman, earn infra-marginal profits D under open access.
Under the tax, these fishermen will be excluded from participating. Thus they will
be in favor of a tax only if their share of the rebate is greater than area D. Given
that tax revenues are rarely returned to group being taxed, it is doubtful that
fishermen will be able to get refunded at the level necessary for them to prefer the
tax solution. Of course, the tax revenues A + C plus the infra-marginal rents B
exceed the sum ofthe infra-marginal rents (A + B + D). However, the point is
simply that with homogenous fishermen there is no reason to oppose the tax even
if it is not fully rebated back to the fishermen, but with heterogeneous fishermen
there is plenty of reason to oppose a tax system.'
A Prediction from the Homogenous Fishermen Model
An even more damning argument can be made against models of homogenous
fishermen if some theory is combined with empirical evidence. Figure 4 shows the
relationship between participation rates and the total gross revenues for selected
' Libecap and Johnson (1982) have offered similar evidence for opposition to transferable
quota systems. Karpoff (1987) also finds evidence that fishermen support rules in which the
number of fishermen able to participate is kept high.372 J. R. Boyce
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Figure 4. Effort as a function of total gross revenues (log-log scale)
fisheries.- The data is shown in a double-iog scale. Each data point represents the
total number of fishermen (on the vertical scale) and the total gross revenues (on
the horizontal scale) for each day in which fishing activity took place during the
1990 season for the fieet. The data does not distinguish between statistical areas
within each region, nor does it control for other factors such as the species mix.
In spite of not correcting for the multitude of differences between species mixes
and areas, the relationships depicted in Figure 4 show a strong linear correlation
between the number of fishermen and the total gross revenues. Also, as is evident
from the scaling of the axes, the slope of the relationship is less than unity in all
cases. For each x% rise in total revenues, there is a less than x% rise in the
number of fishermen participating. (This is confirmed econometrically in Table 1,
where differences in the statistical areas and species mixes have been controlled
for.)
Now, suppose that the data had been produced by the conditions underlying
the homogenous fishermen model. In particular, let fishermen enter until rents are
driven to zero. Then, for output price P and marginal (and average) effort cost of
c, the entry condition is simply
PH/E = c. (I)
^ The Kodiak purse seine and Southeast hand and power troll fleets are not depicted. See
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where H is total harvest and H/E is harvest per unit effort. In keeping with
neoclassical economics, assume that total harvest depends upon effort and the
slock of fish, S. Assume also that the production function f obeys the standard
classical concavity assumptions. Then the second relationship is that
H = f(E,S). (2)
From (1), effort is a function of total harvest H, that is, E = E(H). Inserting this
into (2), we have that the harvest rate depends upon the stock, i.e., H = H(S).
Thus (1) may be rewritten as
P
E = - H(S). (3)
Can it be relationship (3) that is observed in Figure 4? The observed harvest levels
could be shifting because the stock, S, changes. The stock is neither depicted nor
measured, so it is not clear whether that can account for the variation in H.
However, consider the logged version of (3):
ln(E) = ln(P/c) + ln(H(S)). (3')
The relationship in (3') shows that as H increases by x%, E should also increase
by x%. that is:
dln(E) _
dln(H)
However, this hypothesis can be easily rejected by the data, ln Table 1. regres-
sions of the log of effort as a function of the log of total harvest are displayed. To
make the test as fair as possible, variables such as different areas, and differences
in species mix are controlled for. In every instance, the hypothesis that the co-
efficient on total harvest is unity is rejected in favor of the hypothesis that the
coefficient is less than unity. Therefore, the hypothesis that the harvest and effort
data in Figure 4 could be generated by a homogenous fishermen model with
congestion in the aggregate harvest function is rejected for each of the nine data
sets used in the analysis.
A Model with Heterogeneous Fishermen
The question is whether either effort or total gross revenues can be considered
exogenous. It could be argued that total gross revenues fits the requirements of
being exogenous. The price fishermen receive depends upon the total catch over
the entire season for all ofthe salmon fisheries. For a particular day of an opening
price is certainly exogenous. Second, the stock offish available for harvest during
a particular day depends upon the size ofthe run, the weather conditions, and the
length of the opening. These factors are all exogenous to the decision of a fish-
erman to enter or not. Third, the condition that the aggregate production function
be concave in the harvest input is necessary for existence of an equilibrium inEstimating Commercial Fishing Costs in Alaska 375
models in which fishermen are homogenous. However, this requirement is no
longer necessary if fishermen are heterogeneous. Thus it is conceivable that the
aggregate production function be linear in the effort variable over the relevant
range.
On the other hand, if there exists any congestion externality, then the aggre-
gate production function would be concave, and total gross revenues would no
longer be exogenous to the decision to enter the fishery. Since this is an empirical
question, it will not be assumed away by flat. A general model will encompass
both the assumption that the average revenue product function per unit effort is
downward sloping in effort as well as the assumption that the marginal factor cost
of effort is rising as effort increased. Furthermore, according to (2), an estimate of
the stock should also play a part in explaining total harvest and revenues.
ln a homogenous fishermen model with more than one area, the equilibrium
result, ignoring fixed costs and other non-convexities, is that fishermen will dis-
tribute themselves such that rents are fully dissipated in each area. This result
does not hold in a fishery comprised of heterogeneous fishermen. In that case,
there will exist infra-marginal rents. The question, though, is how will the rents be
allocated? For example, suppose that rents decrease with the number of fisher-
men and that there are two classes of fishermen, say high cost and low cost.
Assume that entry occurs until average rents equal the cost of the last entrant in
each location. Then it follows that 1) high cost fishermen will earn zero rents, and
2) that for low cost fishermen to earn positive rents there must be high cost
fishermen participating in each fishery. However, little can be said about the
distribution of the low cost fishermen beyond the fact that they will not all bunch
up into a single area.
Even though little can be said about the distribution of the infra-marginal
fishermen, much can be said about the marginal fisherman. In particular, as long
as the marginal fisherman is not the absolute highest cost fisherman with the right
to fish at the location, then the marginal fisherman will earn zero expected eco-
nomic rents. This is convenient because empirically, it is rarely observed that the
entire fleet is active simultaneously. Thus, the assumption that the marginal en-
trant in each opening is earning zero economic rents does not appear to be vio-
lated.
One other matter deserves some attention. The data suggests that fishermen
are heterogeneous in the returns they obtain as well as in the number openings
they participate. For our purposes, it matters not whether the infra-marginal rents
are because fishermen are homogenous in costs but heterogeneous in harvest or
whether the infra-marginal rents are because fishermen are heterogeneous in costs
but homogeneous in harvest (or, for that matter, some combination). What mat-
ters is that the infra-marginal fishermen earn economic rents and that those who
are last to enter earn zero economic rents. In the model estimated below, it is
assumed that the heterogeneity is with respect to in costs.
Model Specification
Suppose that different fishermen have different costs of fishing. Let the fishermen
be ordered such that the Eth fisherman has higher costs than the (E-I)th fisher-
man, for all E. Thus the effort cost function for the fishery can be represented by376 J. R. Boyce
the cost function c(E,Z), where c(E + 1 ,Z) ^^ c(E,Z), for all E, and Z denotes cost
shifting variables, ff E fishermen enter, the cost of the Eth fisherman will be
C = c(E,Z). (4)
Using the production function relationship in (2), the average revenue product
function may be rewritten as
R = Pf(S,E)/E. (5)
The equilibrium condition will require that the marginal fisherman earn zero eco-
nomic rents. Thus the equilibrium identity is that
C = R. (6)
Fishermen with costs higher than c(E) will choose to not participate in the fishery.
These relationships are depicted in Figure 3, where the common property equi-
librium occurs at Ej.
The net revenues to the E participating fishermen for day t in area i is given by
E
Si,, - Ei.tRi,, - 2 c(e,Z), (7)
and the surplus for the season is given by
A T,
^ ~ ^ ^ ^i.I, (8)
i=l I-l
where A is the number of areas, and Tj is the number of days fishing occurs in
area i.
Figure 5 shows some simple comparative static results for the general hetero-
geneous fishing model. In Figure 5 (a) it is seen that a variable which causes the
average revenue function to shift out (such as an increase in price or stock) will
cause effort, average revenues, and producer's surplus lo rise by the area B. In
Figure 5 (b) it is seen that a variable which causes the participation cost function
to shift out to the right (such as a change in species mix or a lowering of alternative
revenue sources) will cause effort to rise, but average revenues will decline. The
effect on producer's surplus is ambiguous. Producer's surplus rises by the area C
but declines by the area B in Figure 5 (b). These results suggests that factors
which affect the species mix (and hence the average price) may have a positive
effect on producer's surplus from the shifting ofthe average revenue function plus
an ambiguously signed effect from a shift in the effort participation function.
However, for regions which are affected only through the change in average price
there is no ambiguity in the effect on producer's surplus. If price goes up, pro-
ducer's surplus rises, and if price declines, so does producer's surplus. It is onlyEstimating Commercial Eishing Costs in Alaska 377
(a)
Figure 5. Comparative statics effects of shifts in the average revenue function and the
marginal effort cost function
when the reason for the price change is due to changes in the species mix that the
ambiguity slips in.
Econometric Formulation
The econometric model estimated for the system of equations (4)-(6) is a two-
equation model (utilizing the identity (6)) comprised of an effort equation and an
average revenue equation. The effort equation is assumed to have the following
functional form:
-' E = c-'(R,Z) - + + (9)
where e^ is the unexplained error.
The average revenue function is also assumed to be linear. From (5),
R = Pf{S,E)/E = Po + + + + (10)
Because effort and average revenues are jointly determined, the errors eR and
ep are assumed to be contemporaneously correlated. The vector {eR,eE} is as-
sumed to be distributed378 J. R. Boyce
The consequence of (11) is that the system of equations (9) and (10) need to be
estimated using simultaneous equations methods. Thus two- and three-stage-
least-squares methods (2SLS, 3SLS) are used to estimate the system.
The exogenous variables in (9) are of four types. First, it is assumed that
different areas may have different costs. For simplicity, it is assumed that the
effect on the cost function is that the intercept shifts up and down for different
areas, but the slope parameters are constant across areas. Second, a measure of
opportunity cost is employed. Fishermen possess licenses that are fishery specific
in the limited entry fishery in Alaska. A fisherman participating in the Cook Inlet
Purse seine fishery cannot fish also in the Prince William Sound drift net fishery
unless he happens to own a permit for that fishery. Since this is true for only a
very small portion of the fleet, it is assumed that the opportunity costs of partic-
ipating in a particular area within a fishery depends only upon the returns in other
areas within the same fishery. The variable used to measure this opportunity cost
is the difference between the maximum average revenues earned within the fish-
ery for the day and the average revenues earned in area i. The third exogenous
variable that may affect costs is the mix of species. Given that relative prices
between the species do not change at the ex-vessel level throughout the season,
the species mix is perfectly measured by the average price received. Finally, it is
assumed that fixed costs and expectations formations may cause tagged variables
to affect the equilibrium effort level.
It is hypothesized that as average price increases or as the stock increases, the
average revenue function shifts outwards. Changes in the stock also cause the
average revenue function to shift in or out. However, the stock variable is not
directly observed. Because salmon stocks migrate as schools and are harvested as
they approach the rivers, a reasonable proxy for the stock is some sort of moving
window of the harvest rates. The stocky proxy variable is measured as
S,. = H,, -H Hi.,,,/2 + H,,.,/4. (12)
Since the stock proxy in (12) contains contemporaneous harvest, it is assumed
that the proxy variable will be correlated with the contemporaneous disturbances
in (9) and (10). Thus an instrumental variable was used in place of the stock proxy
variable given by (12). The instrumental variable was created by estimating S
using lagged stock, lagged effort, lagged average revenues, area dummies, and
species mix percentages. The estimated values of S from these regressions were
used as the stock proxy variables. The estimated parameters for the stock proxy
instrumental variable equations are not reported. The unadjusted R~ values
ranged between 0.738 to 0.912 for these equations. The most interesting finding
was that the coefficient on the lagged value of the stock proxy was greater than
one in absolute value for each of the nine data sets. This, of course, suggests that
the stock proxy has unstable dynamics. However, the stock is neither stationary
nor approaching a long run equilibrium. The stock proxy measures the flow offish
moving into the river systems. The biological data suggests that these have
roughly bell-shaped time paths. Since each run is of finite length, it begins andEstimating Commercial Fishing Costs in Alaska 379
ends at zero. The stock proxy is measuring a sort of moving average of this
process for a number of different runs. Thus it is not surprising that the dynamics
are relatively unstable. That is the nature ofthe beast.
Econometric Results
The Data
The Alaska Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission (CFEC) maintains a data
base recording a vast amount of information about each landing made by a fish-
erman. This data base covers every salmon fishery in the state, and records have
been maintained since the 197O's. For the purposes of this study, nine fisheries
were selected. Those are the Cook Inlet drift gill net, set gill net, and purse seine
fisheries; the Prince William Sound drift gill net and purse seine fisheries, the
Kodiak set gill net and purse seine fisheries, and the Southeast hand and power
troll fisheries. Data for the year 1990 was used in the analysis. For the purposes
ofthe analysis, data was aggregated into summaries by day and by statistical area
for each gear-type for each of the nine fleets.
Estimates ofthe Average Revenue and Effort Functions
The econometric results using 2SLS and 3SLS are reported in Tables 2 through 5.
The regression equations were estimated in linear form, using routines written by
the author in GAUSS code based on formulas (13.1.20) and (13.2.8) for 2SLS and
3SLS, respectively, in Judge, et a/ (1982). The estimates ofthe covariance matrix
were calculated using formulas (13.2.9) and (13.2.II) from Judge, et al. The de-
pendent variables were measured as the observed average revenues and number
of fishermen participating as in (lO)-(ll). Average revenue, the stock proxy, and
the lags of each were estimates in thousands of dollars. All other variables are
measured in their natural units. The estimated t-ratios are asymptotically normal
distributed with mean 0 and standard deviation of 1.
The 2SLS and 3SLS results for the average revenue equation are reported in
Tables 2 and 3. The equation estimates changed in only a couple of instances at
the precision of two decimal points between the two estimation procedures. In
every fishery the stock variable (STOCK) has a positive and statistically signifi-
cant coefficient and the effort variable (EFFORT) has a negative and statistically
significant coefficient. The average price variable (AVEPRIC) has a positive and
significant coefficient in all but two fisheries. The congestion effect appears to be
the smallest in magnitude in the drift net fisheries.
The results for the effort equation are given in Tables 4 (2SLS) and 5 (3SLS).
The most important variable is the average revenue variable (AVEREV), which
appears with a positive and statistically significant coefficient in every fishery for
both 2SLS and 3SLS. This indicates that the hypothesis that fishermen are ho-
mogenous is strongly rejected for each of the nine fisheries. The lagged variables
are generally, though not always, statistically significant.^ The lagged effort vari-
able (LAG(E)) is positive or not distinguishable from zero in each ofthe fisheries.
' The lagged variables are lagged effort (LAG(E)), lagged average revenue (LAG(R)), and
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However, in the Kodiak purse seine fishery, the coefficient is greater than unity.
But it is not possible to reject the hypothesis that it is less than unity at the 10%
or lower confidence level for either the 2SLS or 3SLS estimate. The variable
measuring the difference between the revenues that could be obtained in the most
profitable area and the revenues earned in the present area (MAXREV) is positive
and significant in six of the nine fisheries. It is only negative and significant in the
Cook Inlet drift net fishery. An increase in MAXREV would be expected to cause
effort to decline. It is not clear exactly what this variable is picking up, but it does
not appear to work well as a proxy variable for opportunity costs. The average
price variable (AVEPRIC) also appears in the effort equation. This variable is a
proxy for the species mix since with given prices in the season, the species mix
uniquely determines the average price for the area for the day. Thus there is no a
priori expectation regarding the sign of this coefficient. The AVEPRIC coefficient
is statistically significant and positive in the two drift net fisheries, negative and
insignificant in the two set net fisheries, negative but only significant in one of the
troll fisheries, and is significant with both a positive and negative sign in the purse
seine fisheries.
Not reported in Tables 4 and 5 are the area dummy variables. These measure
the differences in the intercept relative to area I, which is omitted from the set of
dummy variables. The number of areas varied from fishery to fishery. There were
a maximum of 26 areas in any fishery used in the 3SLS and a maximum of 81 areas
in the 3SLS estimates."* As a group, the area dummy variables are statistically
significant, indicating that there are cost differences between the areas beyond
those differences due to differences in species mix.
In general, the estimation results appear to accept both the hypothesis that
there is congestion in the fisheries (i-e., effort has a negative coefficient in the
average revenue equations) and that there are differences in costs between the
fishermen (i.e., the average revenue variable has a positive coefficient in the effort
equation). Increases in the stock or in average prices shift the average revenue
function outwards, implying that actions which increase these two variables wiil
increase producer's surplus.
The 3SLS results differ from the 2SLS results only slightly for all but one
fishery. The exception is the Kodiak purse seine fishery. The 3SLS estimates of
the effort and average revenue equations for the Kodiak purse seine fishery was
estimated using only observations from areas with more than 20 days of fishing.
The 2SLS estimates reported in Tables 2 and 4 included all of the observations for
the Kodiak purse seine.'^ Although 3SLS is theoretically more efficient than 2SLS,
it suffers from the potential of transmitting misspecification from one equation to
the other. 2SLS does not suffer from this potential problem since it only uses the
information from individual equation being estimated. For the Kodiak purse seine
fishery, bootstrap estimates of the confidence intervals based on a 2SLS model
including all of the observations did not inciude the 2SLS or 3SLS estimates based
only on areas with more than 20 observations for a number of variables. This is
^ The Kodiak purse seine fleet actually reports 81 areas. However, the 3SLS results could
not be obtained when the entire data set was included. Thus areas with less than 20 days
of observations during the season were eliminated from the data. The 2SLS results are
estimated for the entire data set.
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interpreted to mean that leaving out areas with less than 20 observations for this
fishery introduced a misspecification. Therefore, 2SLS results using all of the
observations are used instead of the 3SLS results for all of the fisheries. The
bootstrap estimates of the confidence intervals contain the 2SLS point estimates
using all of the observations almost 100% of the time.
Estimates of Total Revenues, Resource Costs and Producers' Surplus
To obtain a measure of the total costs and producers' surplus, the parameter
estimates from (10) are used along with the predicted values of effort and average
revenues. Ignoring the econometric error, solving (10) for average revenues yields
R - (l/p,)E - p,/p, - (P2/Pi)Z- n3)
For a particular level of effort, the total costs are given by integrating (13) out
toE.
TC(E) = (I/2p,)E^ - [Po/Pi + (P2/Pi)ZlE (14)
The expected total costs are thus
E[TC(E)] = ('/23,)E[E2] - [Po/^i + 0
Var[E]} -
fi (15)
where the first equality is due definition of variance (e.g., DeGroot, 1975, p. 158)
and the second equality is due to substituting in the estimated expected effort and
estimated variance of effort.
Total revenues are estimated similarly. Total revenues are defined as
TR(E,R) = ER. (16)
Thus the expected total revenues are given as
EITR(E,R)] = E[ER] = E[E]E[R] + Cov[E,R] = M -^ §ER. (17)
where the second equality is due to the definition of covariance (e.g., DeGroot,
1975. p. 174) and the third equality uses the estimated means for effort and av-
erage revenues and the estimated covariance. The estimated values of the vari-
ance of effort and the covariance between effort and average revenues are ob-
tained using the residuals from the 2SLS estimation equations. The ijth element
of the estimated covariance matrix is
- k,)(T - kj)l»'^ (18)
where k: is the columns of the matrix of explanatory variables in the ith equation.386 J. R. Boyce
T is the number of observations, and ej is the vector of estimated 2SLS errors of
the ith equation (see Judge, et al, 1982. pp. 377, equations (13.1.16)).
Expected producer's surplus is simply total revenue minus resource costs:
E[PS(E,R)] = {E[TR(E,R)] -
(19)
Formulas (15), (17), (18), and (19) are used to obtain estimates of the resource
costs, total revenues, and producer's surplus for each day of the season in which
fishing activity occurs. The season aggregates are simply the sums over areas and
days fishing as in (7) and (8).
Two problems occur in using (14-19) to estimate producer's surplus. The first
problem is that producer's surplus is a non-iinear function of the estimated pa-
rameters from (9) and (10). Therefore, the distribution of producer's surplus is
unknown. This problem is resolved by using bootstrapping (Efron, 1982). Boot-
strap estimates of the daily estimated producers' surplus values were derived
using the empirical distribution from the reduced form equations estimation. The
process was as follows [e.g.. Kling and Sexton, 1990):
Step I: Estimate the reduced form equations using original data. Eg and RQ.
Obtain empirical estimates of the distribution functions for the errors from the
reduced form equation for effort and for average revenues, e^ and e^, respec-
tively.
Step 2: Draw correlated pairs of errors from the empirical distributions of eR
and eg.*^ Add the errors to the original data to form R* = RQ + eR. and E* = EQ
-(- e^. Estimate the 2SLS equations using R* and E*. Obtain producer's surplus
estimates using (15) and (17-19).
Step 3: Repeat Step 2 for 250 repetitions and report the median (50%), and the
5% and 95% confidence intervals from the empirical distribution.
The second problem associated with (15) and (17-19) is that the estimate of
producer's surplus may not always lie in the interval between zero and the esti-
mated total revenues. For example, the intercept of (13) is not guaranteed to be
positive since the entire function is a linear approximation to the true relationship
between effort and average revenues. Thus it is possible that the right-hand-side
of (13) may be negative. In this case, resource costs would be estimated to be
negative. Similarly, it is also possible that the estimate of resource costs exceeds
the estimate of total revenues for some days. Thus, the resource cost estimates
were restricted to be in the interval between zero and the estimate of total reve-
nues. This approach is clearly ad hoc.
Tables 6 and 7 shows the bootstrap estimates of the average revenue and effort
equations. The bootstrap parameter estimates are almost identical to the 2SLS
and 3SLS point estimates for both equations. The point estimates for the average
*• The errors were drawn as a pair. That is, if the ith error was drawn from the average
revenue equation, then the ith error was simultaneously drawn from effort equation. This
meant that correlation between the errors across equations would be preserved in the
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revenue equations from the 2SLS and 3SLS methods from Tables 2 and 3, re-
spectively, are contained within the 90% confidence intervals for the bootstrap
estimates for all parameters and areas in Table 6. For the effort equation, the
bootstrap 90% confidence interval contains the 2SLS estimates for all the param-
eters in each of the nine fisheries, but not for the 3SLS estimates. The Kodiak
purse seine fishery 3SLS estimates for AVEREC, LAG(N), LAG(S), and
AVEPRIC are outside of the 90% bootstrap estimates. This is also true for the
3SLS estimate of AVEPRIC in the Kodiak set net fishery.
Table 8 contains the bootstrap estimates of the estimated covariance matrix
between the average revenue equation and the effort participation equation. The
estimate is the median from the empirical bootstrap distribution based on 250
replications. Also included are the empirical 5% and 95% confidence interval
points. The highest variance in the effort equation is with the Cook Inlet drift net
fleet, where the standard error of the estimate is approximately 113.6. The equa-
tions generally have a negative covariance term, the exception being the Prince
William Sound drift net fleet. The covariance term is statistically not different
from zero for the Cook Inlet set net fleet and for the Southeast hand troll fleet.
Tables 9 and 10 contain bootstrap estimates of the season gross revenues,
season resource costs, season producer's surplus (all given in millions of 1990
dollars), and the ratio of producer's surplus to total revenues. The estimates
reported are the 2SLS mean and the bootstrap median, as well as the 5% and 95%
estimates from the bootstrap distribution. For total revenues, the actual observed
total revenues are also given. Table 9 is calculated with estimated resource costs
not constrained in the interval between zero and the estimate of total revenues.
Table 10 is calculated with estimated resource costs constrained in the interval
between zero and the estimate of total revenues. This constraint affects only the
resource costs estimates; thus the revenue estimates are identical in the two
tables.
The total season revenue estimates for the 2SLS are quite accurate, being
within 2% of the actual in each of the fisheries. The bootstrap point estimates are
more varied. However, the 90% bootstrap confidence intervals contain the actual
total revenues for seven of the nine fisheries. The two exceptions are the Kodiak
and Prince William Sound purse seine fisheries. In each of these cases the boot-
strap estimates (and the 2SLS point estimates) are less than the actual total rev-
enues. In Table 9, the 2SLS estimates for resource costs are less than the 2SLS
estimates for total revenues in each of the nine fisheries. However, in the two set
net fisheries the 2SLS estimate of resource costs is negative. The bootstrap esti-
mates for the Kodiak set net fieet resource costs include zero in the 90% confi-
dence interval. The negative estimates of resource costs are due to the intercept
of the effort participation equations being negative for a large number of the cases
in these fisheries. Elsewhere, the median bootstrap estimates of resource costs
are greater than the median bootstrap estimates of total revenues for the Cook
Inlet drift net and purse seine fieets. However, for these two fisheries and also for
the Prince William Sound purse seine and Southeast power troll fleets, the 90%
confidence intervals for producer's surplus include zero. The only three fisheries
where the 90% confidence interval estimates of producer's surplus are positive
and does not violate a non-negativity constraint on resource costs are the Prince
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ies. For these fisheries, only for the Prince William Sound drift net fishery is the
2SLS point estimate within the bootstrap 90% confidence interval.
In Table 10 the estimates of resource costs are constrained to being positive
and less than total revenues. For days where resource costs are estimated to be
larger than total revenues, resource costs are constrained to being equal to total
revenues and for days where resource costs are estimated to being negative,
resource costs are set equal to zero. When these constraints are imposed, the
2SLS estimates are contained in the bootstrap 90% confidence interval of all ofthe
fisheries. For the three fisheries which had in aggregate no violation of these
constraints, the estimates are quite similar between Tables 9 and 10, The esti-
mates for the four fisheries which had bootstrap estimates of producer's surplus
that included zero, the producer's surplus estimates are all in the 32-37% of total
revenues range. This is considerably higher than the point estimates when the
constraints on resource costs were not imposed. The set net fisheries have esti-
mated bootstrap (2SLS) resource costs equal to 15% (12%) and 35% (32%) of total
season revenues for Cook Inlet and Kodiak, respectively under the constraints.
Discussion and Conclusions
This paper has developed and estimated an econometric model to measure pro-
ducer's surplus in a commercial fishery. The model explicitly accounts for het-
erogeneity within the fieet as well as for effects from congestion and changes in
the stock. The hypothesis that fishermen are homogenous is rejected both in a
simple test involving only an OLS estimation of effort as a function of total
harvest revenues and in the simultaneous equations model where eflbrt appears
explicitly as an argument in the average revenue function.
The simple linear simultaneous equations model appears to conform with the-
ory with regards to signs of estimated coefTicients, The average revenue function
indicates the presence of congestion and stock effects that accord with theory.
The effort function suggests that fishermen are heterogeneous and that infra-
marginal rents do exist.
There are, however, several important considerations which suggest that these
results should be treated with some caution. One weakness of the model is with
respect to the proxy variable used to measure stock effects. The stock variable
had to be constructed from endogenously determined data on harvest rates. To
alleviate the simultaneous equations bias associated with this variable, an instru-
mental variable was created using lagged values of variables in the system. A
better approach would be one in which estimates of escapement are included in
the construction ofthe stock variable. However, such data is not always available
at the level of dis-aggregation required.
The most important problem of the model appears to be with respect to its
estimates of resource costs. Apparently, the linearization of the effort participa-
tion function forced the intercept to be negative in a number of instances. This
resulted in estimates of resource costs that are negative. This could be in fact true
if the fisheries were being operated by individuals who received non-pecuniary
benefits from fishing. This problem is significant only for the set net fisheries.
These fisheries are the least capital intensive and require the least time input since
they do not require the physical presence ofthe fisherman the whole time. They
are also the most likely to be affected by locational differences in the placement394 J. R. Boyce
of the set net, factors which are not variable within the season. Also, the problem
may be simply due to assumptions made here with regards to functional form.
Resource costs are also estimated to be greater than total revenues for two
fisheries in Cook Inlet (the drift net and purse seine fisheries). This, of course, is
a plausible result, ex post. However, the model uses ex ante predictions. In the
drift net case, the problem is likely due to the large econometric estimation error
(a standard error of the estimate of 113.6 fishermen). For the Cook Inlet purse
seine fishery, the 2SLS point estimate of the ratio between producer's surplus and
total revenues given in Table 9 is almost identical to the 2SLS and bootstrap
estimates given in Table 10. The fact that the bootstrap estimate in Table 9 is so
far off suggests that the assumption of identical and independent errors necessary
for bootstrapping may be violated in this fishery.
In summary, the model suggests that the assumption that fishermen are ho-
mogenous is highly suspect. The presence of infra-marginal rents is a factor which
needs to receive more consideration in the design of fisheries policy. This paper
suggests a way in which these rents may be measured and presents some tentative
estimates for the Alaskan salmon fisheries.
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